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LAW AS HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE:
LAW, POLITICS, AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE BURNHAM PLAN OF CHICAGO
SINCE 1909
RICHARD J. RODDEWIG,* J.D., MAI, CRE, FRICS
PRESIDENT, CLARION ASSOCIATES, INC.
I.

THE BURNHAM PLAN AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
HAMILTONIAN DEMOCRATIC IDEALS IN 1909 CHICAGO

Every one knows that the civic conditions which prevailed fifty years
ago would not now be tolerated anywhere; and every one believes
that conditions of to-day will not be tolerated by the men who shall
follow us. This must be so, unless progress has ceased. The
education of a community inevitably brings about a higher
appreciation of the value of systematic improvement, and results in
a strong desire on the part of the people to be surrounded by
conditions in harmony with the growth of good taste ... .
In the summer of 1906, Daniel Burnham and Joseph Medill
McCormick, publisher of the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, found themselves
on the same transcontinental train headed from San Francisco
back home to Chicago. 2 Burnham had been in San Francisco
trying, although unsuccessfully, to convince its civic leaders to
forge ahead with implementation of his plan for San Francisco
that had been set for public presentation on the precise day in
April when the great San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and
* Richard J. Roddewig, JD, MAI, CRE, FRICS is President of Clarion
Associates, Inc., a land use, planning, zoning and real estate consulting and
appraisal firm headquartered in Chicago. Mr. Roddewig has authored, edited
or contributed to eight books and more than fifty articles on land use, zoning,
environmental and real estate appraisal issues. He has an undergraduate
degree in history and government from the University of Notre Dame and both
a M.A. in political science and a law degree from the University of Chicago.
He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Real Estate Center at John
Marshall Law School.
1. DANIEL H. BURNAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO 121
(Charles Moore ed., Princeton Architectural Press 1993) (1908) [hereinafter
PLAN OF CHICAGO].
2. CARL SMITH, THE PLAN OF CHICAGO: DANIEL BURNHAM AND THE
REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CITY 68 (The University of Chicago Press 2006).
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resulting fire destroyed much of that city. Burnham was in a dour
mood on that train ride since San Francisco's political leaders,
much like those of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
had made it quite clear to Burnham that quick reconstruction of
the city to its previous pattern rather than redevelopment
according to a new vision and plan was the politically expedient
course.
Burnham and McCormick had known each other for years.
They had plenty of time for discourse during that long
transcontinental trip. McCormick urged Burnham to forget his
disappointment about the failure of San Francisco's civic leaders to
adopt Burnham's vision. "Turn your attention back home,"
McCormick must have told Burnham. "Create a great civic plan for
Chicago instead." 3 Burnham was skeptical. He saw even greater
obstacles in Chicago than he had encountered in San Francisco.
He now knew from his planning work there, as well as in
Cleveland and Washington, D.C., that the backing of the business
and political leaders was indispensable to successful consensus
about and implementation of a comprehensive plan.
But for McCormick and the TRIBUNE, there was an urgent
new motivation. The reputation of Chicago had been badly
tarnished by Upton Sinclair's THE JUNGLE, a nationwide best
seller, and by Lincoln Steffens THE SHAME OF THE CITIES. Both
books exposed in graphic terms the social costs of Chicago's
lightning quick growth into America's second largest city. The
nation was beginning to focus more on the squalor in so many
Chicago neighborhoods and its rampant political corruption rather
than its remarkable ascendance into the ranks of world class
cities.
They were on a street which seemed to run on forever, mile after
mile-thirty-four of them, if they had known it-and each side of it
one uninterrupted row of wretched little two-storey frame buildings.
Down every side street they could see it was the same-never a hill
and never a hollow, but always the same endless vista of ugly and
dirty little wooden buildings. Here and there would be a bridge
crossing a filthy creek, with hard-baked mud shores and dingy sheds
and docks along it; here and there would be a railroad crossing, with
a tangle of switches, and locomotives puffing, and rattling freight
cars filing by; here and there would be a great factory, a dingy
building with innumerable windows in it, and immense volumes of
3. Id. This was not the first time this idea had been broached to Burnham.
In fact, Burnham himself for many years had been proposing some of the
elements that would later become parts of the Plan. In February of 1897, just
after the end of the World's Columbian Exposition, Burnham had made a
presentation to the Merchants Club, an entity that later merged with the
Commercial Club, on "The Needs of a Great City." Id. at 67. Around the same
time, he had also addressed the Commercial Club itself on the topic of "What
Can Be Done to Make Chicago More Attractive?" Id.
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smoke pouring from the chimneys, darkening the air above and
making filthy the earth beneath. But after each of these
interruptions, the desolate procession would begin again-the
procession of dreary little buildings. 4
These muckrakers were also, in the eyes of Chicago's business
elite, poisoning the public's mind with a description of Chicago's
business leaders as capitalists run amok with no ethics or social
consciousness.
McCormick and the other Chicago business leaders were
indignant at the charges hurled at them by the muckrakers such
as Steffens and Hamland Garland during this middle decade of the
thirty year Progressive Era that lasted from 1890 to 1920. After
all, they, like their President, Theodore Roosevelt, were
Republicans5 and "Progressives" with a capital "P". The
Republican Party had become the party of the Progressives, and
Roosevelt was its leader. They believed the success of Chicago was
intimately connected to their personal success as leaders of
business and industry. And they knew that the Commercial Club
of Chicago, the organizational entity behind the 1909 Plan of
Chicago, had been founded in 1877 by thirty-nine leading
businessmen for the express purpose of "advancing by social
intercourse and by a friendly interchange of views the prosperity
and growth of the city of Chicago."6 After all, one could not
achieve membership in the Commercial Club unless one had
demonstrated an "interest in the general welfare" as demonstrated
"by a record of things actually done and of liberality, as well as by
willingness to do more" and "a broad and comprehending
sympathy with important affairs of city and state, and a generous
subordinating of self in the interests of the community."7
The Commercial Club and its related entity, the Merchants
Club, had even hosted presentations by prominent reformers
Jacob Riis and Jane Adams on the playground movement and
discussions on such other topics as municipal finances, public
fraud, "Our City Streets," "pollution, unemployment [and] labor
violence."8
But locally, Chicago was not then-and is not now-a
Republican town. Its democratic aldermen, especially those that
controlled the downtown precincts, were notoriously corrupt. The
council's Gray Wolves, "a group of ethically challenged and

4. UPTON SINCLAIR, The Jungle 26 (Penguin Books 2006) (1906).
5. SMITH, supra note 2, at 66. A promotional document published by the
Commercial Club just before release of the final plan of 1909 listed thirty-two
of its members as involved in the project and "virtually all were Protestant
and Republican." Id.
6. Id. at 64.
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id.
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politically powerful" city council members 9 that included
"Bathhouse" John Coughlin and Mike "Hinky Dink" Kenna were
still powerful despite repeated attempts by progressive reformers,
led by the Civic Federation and the Municipal Voters League, to
defeat them and limit their power in the council through
procedural steps. In the April 1909 aldermanic elections, Coughlin,
Kenna, and the other Gray Wolves faced only token opposition and
were re-elected handily despite pronouncements by both the Civic
Federation and the Municipal Voters League that all of them were
"totally unfit" for office. 10
The local democratic councilmen were secure in their political
base. They provided jobs and support for the immigrants and
working class families in exchange for political support at election
time, a Democratic Party practice that had become a part of the
accepted way of life in Chicago.
And the working class backgrounds of the political leaders
could not have been more in contrast with the Ivy League
backgrounds of the core group1 that signed on to develop and
promote the Burnham Plan.
As a result, McCormick, Burnham and the other business and
civic leaders did not have much faith in the support they might
receive from the local, small "d" democratic process. In a speech to
the Commercial Club in 1904, Burnham had urged action outside
the political process using the resources of the business
community in order to assure that Chicago's growth and
development would continue apace. He expressed little hope in
getting the public sector to join in the process-but he knew that
somehow the eventual support of the public sector would be
essential to realizing his vision of the future of Chicago. Burnham
put it bluntly: "The public authorities do not do their duty and
they must be made to." But how that public sector support was to
be garnered was far from clear. Any planning effort to improve the
image and character of the city and the lot of its citizens would
have to be led-and paid for-by its business leaders.
No doubt these business leaders were genuinely motivated to
improve the lot of all Chicagoans including the lower class
European immigrants who poured its steel and butchered its hogs,
and the rural farm girls who sold its drygoods and toiled in its
factories. But they also wanted to restore the reputation of
Chicago and demonstrate to the world that the civic spirit that had
9. Id. at 49.
10. Id. at 51. Progressives had made some political progress by getting the
reformer Carter Harrison II elected Mayor for two terms, once from 1897-1905
and again from 1911-1915. Id. at 49.
11. Ten of the thirty-two members of the Commercial Club listed in a
promotional document as contributing significantly to development of the Plan
had attended Harvard, Yale or Princeton. Id. at 66.
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created the inspirational Great White City of the World's
Columbian Exposition could indeed make the city a better place to
live for all of its citizens. 12 Those that had been in Chicago since
the 1880s, like Burnham, were fearful that the endless
opportunities for Chicago's expansion and growth that had seemed
so boundless in 1889 had somehow become constricted. Theodore
Dreiser could describe 1889 Chicago in SISTER CARRIE as follows:
In 1889 Chicago had the peculiar qualifications of growth ..

..

Its

many and growing commercial opportunities gave it widespread
fame, which made of it a giant magnet, drawing to itself, from all
quarters, the hopeful and the hopeless-those who had their fortune
yet to make and those whose fortunes and affairs had reached a
disastrous climax elsewhere. It was a city of over 500,000, with the
ambition, the daring, the activity of a metropolis of a million. Its
streets and houses were already scattered over an area of seventyfive square miles. Its population was not so much thriving upon
established commerce as upon the industries which prepared for the
arrival of others. The sound of the hammer engaged upon the
erection of new structures was everywhere heard. Great industries
were moving in. The huge railroad corporations which had long
before recognized the prospects of the place had seized upon vast
tracts of land for transfer and shipping purposes. Street-car lines
had been extended far out into the open country in anticipation of
rapid growth. The city had laid miles and miles of streets and
sewers through regions where, perhaps, one solitary house stood out
alone-a pioneer of the populous ways to be. There were regions
open to the sweeping winds and rain, which were yet lighted
throughout the night with long, blinking lines of gas-lamps,
fluttering in the wind. Narrow board walks extended out, passing
here a house, and there a store, at far intervals, eventually ending
on the open prairie.13
By 1906, however, as Burnham and McCormick travelled
back to Chicago from San Francisco, the city had quickly
developed a different reputation for environmental degradation
and public squalor.
Upton Sinclair in THE JUNGLE described the palpable change
in the environment as you approached the city by train in 1905 as
follows:
A full hour before the party reached the city they had begun to note
the perplexing changes in the atmosphere. It grew darker all the
time, and upon the earth the grass seemed to grow less green.
12. There has always been an unresolved back story to the Plan involving
Burnham's handwritten first drafts of significant sections devoted to solving
such social ills which were not included in the final version of the Plan as
published. See id. at 106 (discussing Burnham's ideas for improving life for
Chicagoans).
13. THEODORE DREISER, SISTER CARRIE 31-33 (University of Pennsylvania
Press 1991).

380

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:375

Every minute, as the train sped on, the colors of things became
dingier; the fields were grown parched and yellow, the landscape
hideous and bare. And along with thickening smoke they began to
notice another circumstance, a strange pungent odour. 14
Burnham and McCormick were well aware of this change in
the city. As the 1909 Plan of Chicago put it, "Conditions in
Chicago are such as to repel outsiders and drive away those who
are free to go." 15 Changing these conditions and restoring the
reputation of the city was one of the central goals of the 1909
planning effort.
Burnham and these public-spirited civic leaders of Chicago
"believed in the ethos of the City Beautiful movement"'16 that
cities-and their inhabitants-could be transformed and uplifted
by concerted public actions led by enlightened civic leaders and
designers as exemplified by the 1893 World's Fair. These problems
changing the city for the worse could be met head on and
eliminated.
What was needed was a top-down transformation, one based
on Hamiltonian democratic principles. In the Hamiltonian vision
of America, men of wealth occupying positions of civic leadership
had responsibilities as citizens of the republic-"the statesman's
responsibilities to the public good and for the powers granted to
him."' 7 "In Hamilton's theory of republicanism, ambitious men
could be trusted with quantities of power extraordinary for
republics because their historical reputations would so clearly
depend on truly serving the public good."18
In 1909, Hamilton, and Chicago's civic-as opposed to
political-leaders distrusted the same common people for whom
they were planning the City Beautiful. The Haymarket Riot and
Pullman Strike of the 1890s had created a fundamental rift
between workers and management. The civic and business
leadership also distrusted Chicago's notoriously corrupt
politicians, especially those who controlled the downtown First
Ward where so many of Chicago's civic leaders had their offices.
These politicians were the antithesis of the leadership of the
Commercial Club.
So that was the business, social, and political setting as
Chicago's civic leaders embarked on the effort to craft a plan for

SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 26.
PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 124.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 14.
Robert W.T. Martin, "Reforming Republicanism: Alexander Hamilton's
Theory of Republican Citizenship and Press Liberty' in THE MANY FACES OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF AMERICA'S MOST ELUSIVE
FOUNDING FATHER X, 110 (Douglas Ambrose & Robert W.T. Martin eds.,
2006).
18. Id. at 110.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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the city with Daniel Burnham as the master craftsman. There
were at least four competing interest groups involved in the
interplay that would define the future of Chicago and the success
or failure of efforts to implement Burnham's vision: the
Republican educated business and civic leaders, the Progressive
ward-based
political
the
entrenched
local
reformers,
establishment, and the inhabitants of Chicago's various
neighborhoods, who at the time, were primarily working class first
generation immigrants with close ties to their extended families
and places of worship and their precinct captains.
Implementation of the plan would need the support of
significant components of all four of these groups. And the
interplay and political maneuverings between those same four
groups so palpable in 1909 has continued for one hundred years to
define the way in which planning-and later, zoning-in the wake
of the 1909 Plan has and has not been implemented in the city and
its region.
It has been a continuing story of strong political and civic
leaders emerging from the fray to implement pieces of the
Burnham Plan in accordance with his vision. The progress has
been in fits and starts, but it has always been forward.
And behind it all, quietly at work, are the practical political
and legal limitations imposed on Chicago's ability to get things
done.
The untold story of the implementation of the Burnham Plan
of 1909 is the story of how our Illinois laws, our Illinois judicial
decisions, and our Chicago and Illinois judges have shaped the
legacy of that plan, sometimes in a manner promoting Burnham's
vision and at other times thwarting it. Truly, the law has been the
hidden architecture-and judges the hidden architects-of what
we have accomplished in Chicago in pursuing Burnham's vision as
of the 2009 centennial of the 1909 Plan.
II.

THE HIDDEN LEGAL ARCHITECTURE BEHIND THE
BURNHAM PLAN

The Hamiltonian underpinnings of the City Beautiful
Movement and the 1909 Plan of Chicago becomes immediately
apparent in some of its opening lines such as the following: "Great
success cannot be attained unless the special work in hand shall
be entrusted to those best fitted to undertake it." Or consider the
Plan's statement, in referring to the World's Columbian Exposition
of 1893 as its inspiration, that "[ilt had become the habit of our
[Chicago] business men to select some one to take the
responsibility in every important enterprise; and to give to that
person earnest, loyal, and steadfast support."9 The Plan
19. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 4.
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attributes the success of the World's Fair to, first, "loyalty to the
city and to its undertakings" and, second, "to the habit of
entrusting great works to men trained in the practice of such
undertakings." 20 The Plan was the embodiment of a political
philosophy grounded in fundamental skepticism about enlightened
"reason" prevailing in a mass democracy.
For most Chicagoans over the years, when the 1909 Burnham
Plan of Chicago is mentioned, two images come to mind. The first
image is of a few pithy maxims attributed to Burnham but not
actually in the Plan document itself. The most famous is the
following:
Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood ....
Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a
noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we
are gone will be a living thing, asserting itself with ever-growing
insistency. 21
The second image that comes to mind involves the wonderful
Jules Guerin drawings included in the Plan, particularly the
drawings involving concepts for the lakefront.
But as a result of the Burnham Plan centennial celebration it
is important to revisit the actual document itself, open it up again,
perhaps for the first time in many years, and review it in detail.
The 1909 Plan of Chicago is organized into eight chapters, each
ranging from eight to twenty-two pages, titled as follows:
Chapter I.
Origin of the Plan of Chicago
Chapter II.
City Planning in Ancient and Modern Times
Chapter III. Chicago, The Metropolis of the Middle West
Chapter IV. The Chicago Park System
Transportation
Chapter V.
Chapter VI. Streets Within the City
Chapter VII. The Heart of Chicago
Chapter VIII. Plan of Chicago
Hidden away at the very back of the volume is an Appendix.
At thirty pages, it is the longest component of the text. The title of
the Appendix is Legal Aspects of the Plan of Chicago.
The legal Appendix was written by Walter L. Fisher, as
counsel for the Plan Committee of the Commercial Club of
Chicago. Fisher was a Commercial Club member and former
President of the Chicago Municial Voters League. 22 The
frontispiece to the Appendix lists twelve legal reviewers "all of
20. Id. at 6.
21. Urban Development and Design Theory, http://www.arch.umd.edu/
ARCH654/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
22. Reading the Plan, The Encyclopedia of Chicago, http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/300006.html
(last visited Mar. 21,
2010). Fisher would later go on to be Secretary of the Interior under President
Taft. Id.
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whom concur in the conclusions and recommendations stated."23
The fact that there were twelve legal reviewers including the
Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, the Cook County
Attorney, and various past and present attorneys for the West
Chicago, Lincoln Park, and South Park Commissions, provides a
clear insight into the legal basis of "planning" in the early years of
the twentieth century. There must have been considerable
disagreement in the legal community about the appropriateness of
alternative methods for accomplishing the goals and vision of the
Plan. The Commercial Club needed somehow to demonstrate to
the political machine-and perhaps the courts-that there was a
consensus among the portions of the legal community that would
be charged with implementing the Plan.
Chapter VIII of the Plan of 1909, titled "The Plan of Chicago,"
made the importance of a legal agenda very clear: "It is quite
possible that some revision of existing laws may be necessary in
order to enable the people to carry out this project; but this is
clearly within the power of the people themselves." 24
The primary legal tool to implement the plan was not land
use regulation but rather acquisition of land through the power of
eminent domain combined with publicly financed infrastructure
improvements. That emphasizes a very important point about the
1909 Plan of Chicago-it was not a modern twenty-first century
comprehensive land use plan. There is only limited discussion of
enacting land use regulations to accomplish the Plan's objectives.
Instead, the Plan proposes a massive program of public
investment to build and relocate major thoroughfares, widen
streets, relocate train stations and tracks, construct a new civic
center, and create public parks in city neighborhoods, along the
lakefront, and in the outlying suburbs. 25

23. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 126. The twelve reviewers listed are
Edward J. Brundage, Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago; Harry A.
Lewis, County Attorney of Cook County; Benjamin F. Richolson, Attorney for
the West Chicago Park Commissioners; Charles A. Churan, Attorney for the
Commissioners of Lincoln Park; Robert Redfield, Attorney for the South Park
Commissioners; Edgar B. Tolman, Frank L. Shepard, Harry S. Mecartney,
Frank Hamlin, and R. P. Hollett, all listed as counsel to the three park
commissions previously identified; Milton J. Foreman, Member of the City
Council; and George A. Mason, Special Assessment Attorney for the City of
Chicago. In addition, William W. Case is identified as having "assisted in the
preparation of the opinion." Id.
24. Id. at 119.
25. Specifically, the Plan promotes the
acquisition, maintenance, and control of parks, boulevards and arteries
of communication throughout the metropolitan territory tributary to
Chicago; the establishment and control of similar parks, circuits and
avenues within the city itself, and incidentally the reclamation of slums
and congested areas; the embellishment of the shore of Lake Michigan;
the consolidation and rearrangement of freight and passenger
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was

one

The street plan as laid out involves a very considerable amount of
money; but it will be found that in Chicago as in other cities, the
opening of new thoroughfares, although involving large initial
expense, creates an increase in values ....
The cost will amount to many millions of dollars, but the result will
be continuous prosperity for all who dwell here; and such prosperity
the city cannot have unless it becomes a convenient and pleasant
place in which to live. 26
As a result, most of the legal discussion in the Appendix deals
with the statutory authority of various types of special local
government units in the Chicago metropolitan area to exercise the
power of eminent domain. A considerable amount of text is
dedicated to the creation of park districts and to the need for intermunicipal cooperation in creating multi-jurisdictional parks and
boulevard systems. 27
The legal addendum is not a soaring and confident expression
of a vision about using the law to implement the Plan. Instead, it
is an almost pessimistic statement of the limits of American land
use and planning law contrasted sharply with an envious look at
the lack of such limits in European law of the same era.
This constrained focus on eminent domain and public
investment was a direct result of the Illinois legal situation that
faced Daniel Burnham and the civic leaders backing the Plan.28
The legal Appendix laments the "rigid constitutional constraints" 29
on Chicago's authority to implement the 1909 Plan. The most
significant constraint, in the eyes of the lawyers who reviewed and
terminals; and the creation of a Civic Center connected with other parts
of the city by convenient avenues, and in or about which shall be
grouped important public buildings which may hereafter be erected.
Id. at 129-30.
26. Id. at 123-24.

27. See id. at 130-38 (dedicating eight pages to discussing outer parks, city
parks, squares, and the lake shore development).
28. The perception was not necessarily in accord with historic reality. See
generally, FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES, AND JOHN BANTA, Council on
Envtl. Quality, THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED
LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS, (1973) (examining

the taking clause in the Constitution and land use regulations).
29. The authors of the Appendix reason that
[tihe purpose of an inquiry into the legal aspects of the Plan of Chicago
is to ascertain to what extent and in what manner the Plan can be
carried out under the existing laws, to suggest such additional
legislation as may be necessary or desirable, and to consider how far
such legislations is controlled or prevented by existing constitutional
provisions.
PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 127.
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approved the legal appendix in the 1909 Plan, was the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on "the taking of private property for
public use" and its accompanying guarantee that "no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law."30
The principal focus of the discussion in the 1909 Plan of
Chicago regarding "the police power"-even in 1909 the authority
of government to provide for the health, safety and general welfare
was commonly called "the police power"-is on lands adjacent to
public parks. The goal of regulating lands adjacent to public parks
is to "prevent offensive advertising, restrict the kinds of
businesses, if any, to be conducted thereon, and make appropriate
regulation of the height, manner of construction, and location of
the surrounding buildings."31 After reciting those goals, Walter
Fisher, writing for the legal review team, quickly concluded that
the police power "is quite inadequate to the solution of this special
problem" and cited a Harvard Law Review article for support that
on both 'theoretical and practical grounds"' the police power
cannot be exercised to accomplish "'public aesthetic ends."' 32
The legal appendix contrasts the constitutionally constrained
American-style city planning with the "sweeping undertakings and
arbitrary though effective methods of European city planning"3 3
possible in the absence of constitutional protections for private
property owners embodied in the takings and due process clauses
of the Fifth Amendment. The Plan laments that such "widereaching reforms" could only be implemented in Chicago "with
important modifications." 34 Among the innovative "reforms" listed
are prohibiting advertising that "might "disfigure the landscape,"
maintaining "the suburban character of certain localities," and
imposing building setback lines for public streets.3 5 The problem,
according to the legal Appendix, is that in the United States
"compensation is allowed to any owner of property who can show
himself to be injured by such restrictions upon the use of his
land"36 while the European legal system imposed no such
requirement of compensation.37 The property owner in America
could also challenge the basic constitutionality of such regulations
as a taking of his property for a "public use" and in Illinois could
even demand a jury trial to fix the just compensation--even for a
30. Id.
31. Id. at 139-40.
32. Id. at 140, (citing Wilbur Lardemore, Public Aesthetics, 20 HARV. L.
REV. 35, 43 (1906-07).
33. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 127.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS Sec. 182 (Univ. of Chi. Press. 1904)) (noting the
comparison of American and European land use law).
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building setback regulation!38
The solution to this legal problem was to establish a whole
new way of thinking about the definition of what was, and was
not, a public use: "[t]he conception of a public use must alter and
expand with the development of civilization, and especially with
the growth of cities."39
III.

BREAKING THE POLICE POWER IMPASSE: NEW YORK

STYLE ZONING "DISTRICTING" COMES TO CHICAGO
The history of zoning in Chicago is a . . . story of bold visions
trimmed by political reality, residents battling developers, and
40
occasional misfires stirring up great controversy.
Today, the central element of virtually every comprehensive
city plan is a set of recommendations for changes to the local
zoning and development code. But when Burnham and the
Commercial Club published the Plan of Chicago in 1909, the
concept of zoning-"districting" as it was commonly called thenwas in its infancy.
Only a few of the components of a modern zoning ordinance,
such as building height limits, to be discussed later, were in place
in 1909 when the Plan of Chicago was published. The legal
41
appendix to the 1909 Plan of Chicago discusses Welch v. Swasey,
the 1906 Massachusetts Supreme Court case that first upheld "the
right of the legislature to delegate to a city the power to regulate
the height of buildings, to prescribe different regulations for
different districts, and to invest a commission with the right to
determine the boundaries between such districts," in other words,
42
the right to zone.
In other parts of the country, Welch was seen as a radical
departure from established precedent. Walter Fischer, after
summarizing the significance of the Welch decision, laments that
given Illinois judicial attitudes, "[iut is doubtful whether local
distinctions of this character would be sustained in Chicago under
existing legislation, except in so far as might be justified by the
power to establish fire limits." 43 Fischer and his legal committee
believed judicial attitudes in Illinois related to nuisance law,
prohibited Boston-style use districting in Chicago:
38. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 127-28 (describing the recourse for a
citizen of the United States and Illinois should his property be converted for
public use).
39. Id. at 142.
40. JOSEPH P. SCHWIETERMAN & DANA M. CASPALL, THE POLITICS OF
PLACE: A HISTORY OF ZONING IN CHICAGO, 1 (Jane Heron ed., Lake Claremont
Press 2006).
41. 79 N.E. 745 (Mass. 1906).
42. Id.
43. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 141.

2010]

Law as Hidden Architecture

387

A business which is an actual nuisance may be prohibited
altogether; and the legal machinery exists for excluding saloons and
some other kinds of business from limited areas. Such exercise of
the police power must, however, bear some reasonable relation to
the public health, safety, or morals, and could not, under existing
constitutional restraints, be extended to business in general.44
It would take fifteen more years of legal slogging in the
Illinois legislature and the courts before Chicago actually enacted
its first comprehensive zoning code. It was not a walk in the park.
Chicago had been using so-called "frontage consent laws" for
twenty years as an indirect method for regulating some types of
"nuisance" uses. A use could be prohibited on a particular block
front if a stipulated percentage of property owners on the street
voted to prohibit it. Such "frontage consent" laws had become a
routine part of pre-zoning neighborhood planning in Chicago and
other cities since at least the 1880s. Frontage consent restrictions
on livery stables were adopted by Chicago in 1887 and eventually
upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v.
Stratton45 in 1896. Soon frontage consent laws had been enacOd
by Chicago to contrl many other uses deemed "nuisances" by the
City Council. "[B]y 1905 the City was using a common system of
frontage consents to regulate construction not only of stables but
billboards, hospitals, gas reservoirs, blacksmiths, foundries,
packing
houses, rendering
plants, tanneries,
breweries,
distilleries, junkshops, laundries, grain elevators and soap making
plants."46
In 1913, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Friend v.
City of Chicago,47 invalidated a City of Chicago frontage consent
ordinance that prohibited retail stores on a residential block in the
absence of approval by other property owners on the street front.48
Other courts around the country had recently also invalidated
frontage consent requirements. The year before the Illinois
decision in the Friend case, the United States Supreme Court had
invalidated a Richmond, Virginia frontage consent law in Eubank
v. City of Richmond.49 The legal ground used by the Illinois

44. Id. Interestingly, Fischer cites only two cases to support this
pessimistic view of Illinois courts, and one of them, City of St. Louis v. Hill, 22
S.W. 861 (Mo. 1893), is a Missouri rather than Illinois case. PLAN OF
CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 141.
45. 44 N.E. 853 (Ill. 1896).
46. Fred P. Bosselman, "The Commodification of "'Nature's Metropolis"
The Historical Context of Illinois' Unique Zoning Standards," 12 N. ILL. U. L.

REV. 527, 571 (1991-1992) (internal quotations omitted). This system was
subject to open and notorious political abuse. Proponents and opponents of
various uses engaged in extensive vote buying campaigns.
47. 103 N.E. 609 (111. 1913).
48. Id. at 612.
49. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
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Supreme Court in Friend to invalidate frontage consents was both
equal protection-the statute only regulated groceries and meat
markets and not all retail stores-and invalidity of any law based
solely on aesthetic considerations. The case went further and said
the city council did not have the power to "deprive a citizen of
valuable property rights under the guise of prohibiting or
regulating some business or occupation that has no tendency
whatever to injure the public health or public morals or interfere
with the general welfare."5 o
With frontage consent laws legally dead, the implementers of
the Burnham Plan had lost their only established land use legal
tool for regulating uses. So they then turned for inspiration to the
innovative, but as yet not widely adopted, concept of zoning as it
was developing in Boston and most notably for Chicago, in New
York City. The need for zoning regulation of uses was generally
supported by the Chicago business and real estate community-if
not by the courts-during the decade following the publication of
the Burnham Plan. The Chicago Real Estate Board had been a
strong promoter of the use of frontage consent laws to assure
uniformity of use in particular neighborhoods. The real estate
community favored such uniformity because "a relatively uniform
pattern of uses within the neighborhood . .. would maximize the

aggregate value of property by avoiding the value reductions that
were assumed to be the result of 'incompatible' neighboring
uses." 51
In 1914, Alderman Charles Merriam took up the torch for a
zoning code as a substitute for the legally repudiated frontage
consent concept. Merriam had attended the University of Chicago
during the years of the World's Fair construction and was now a
political science professor there. 52 In 1911, he unsuccessfully ran
for mayor on a reformer's platform. He now made it his mission to
do two things: first, get the Illinois legislature to adopt enabling
legislation authorizing cities and villages to adopt comprehensive
zoning laws; second, shepherd a zoning code through the Chicago
City Council.
Among Merriam and other reformers in Chicago, "[zioning
was not only a tool to reduce land-use conflicts, it was seen as an
integral part of the effort to rid Chicago of its image as a crowded,
dirty, and corrupt city."53
In 1914, Merriam authored a technical report describing the
social and economic basis for using zoning to protect residential
50. Friend, 103 N.E. at 611.
51. Bosselman, supra note 46, at 568-69.
52. Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago Centennial Catalogues,
(last visited
http://www.1ib.uchicago.edule/spclcentcat/fac/facchl5_01.html
Apr. 6, 2010).
53. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 24.
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neighborhoods from an inevitable transformation into industrial
areas. 54 Zoning would help stabilize these residential
neighborhoods and slow what was seen as an inevitable pattern of
change in big city neighborhoods. Merriam's report was adopted by
the Chicago City Council in 1917.55 With the report in hand,
Merriam then drafted enabling legislation granting authority to
cities and villages "to establish residential, business, and
industrial districts."56 The legislation was introduced into the
Illinois General Assembly in 1917.
State Senator Edward Glackin, who feared giving
municipalities absolute power to adopt city wide zoning codes,
proposed amendments to the Merriam legislation that applied
frontage consent principles to create neighborhood by
neighborhood zoning by referendum. Under the Glackin additions,
a municipality would propose a district plan for approval by
property owners in a particular neighborhood. If sixty percent of
the property owners approved of the plan, then the city council
could prepare a zoning ordinance appropriate for that particular
neighborhood.57 The so-called Glackin Law rather than Merriam's
legislation was enacted by the General Assembly in 1919. In an
editorial, the CHICAGO TRIBUNE urged the city to enact a zoning
code now because the state had created at least a piece of the legal
machinery to do so.58
As enacted in 1919, the Illinois Zoning Enabling Act would
not allow the New York style city-wide zoning that many in
Chicago, including Edward Bennett, the co-author of the 1909
Plan, saw as absolutely necessary. Bennett had come to realize
that city wide zoning was essential to the implementation of the
1909 Plan of Chicago, and now, together with Merriam and others,
began to lead the technical efforts to prepare a zoning code for
Chicago.
The New York influence on Burnham as an architect is well
known. The New York influence on Bennett as a zoning advocate
is not so widely known. Well before his association with New York
architects such as Richard Hunt and Charles McKim in designing
the 1893, World's Columbian Expositions, Daniel Burnham had
become well acquainted with New York society and New York
society with him. In March of 1893 before the opening of the

54. Bosselman, supra note 46, at 573-74.
55. Chicago City Council, Building Districts & Restrictions (Cornell Univ.
Library 2001) (1917).
56. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 17.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Specifically, the CHICAGO TRIBUNE argued that "Chicago is a big place.
There is room for everybody. There ought to be residence districts reserved for
homes, and factory districts reserved for manufacturing." CHI. TRIB., June 20,
1919.
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World's Fair, Burnham was feted at Madison Square Garden in
New York by his fellow east coast architects involved in the design
of the soon-to-open Chicago exposition.59 In 1900 he had opened a
small affiliated office in New York to supervise his New York and
east coast commissions.60 Over the years, Burnham and Root and
Daniel H. Burnham & Co. had designed a number of buildings in
New York City including the iconic Flatiron Building.6 1
Edward M. Bassett, a New York attorney, former one-term
U.S. Congressman and the father of the American zoning
movement, was well known to both Burnham and Bennett. There
was extensive correspondence between Bassett and both Burnham
and Bennett over many years. 62 In 1911, Burnham and Bennett
met with him in New York City. In October of 1916, a group of
Chicago civic leaders interested in the zoning debate went to New
York City to meet with Bassett who had led New York's effort to
adopt a zoning code and had recently been named chairman of
New York's Citizen's Zoning Committee.6 3
Although Bassett had been to Chicago on many occasions,
including a visit in 1893 to the World's Fair, he now began to make
regular trips to Chicago. Bassett saw serious legal problems in the
Glackin Law adopted by the Illinois legislature in 1919. The "wide
disparities in land-use regulations between neighborhoods" 64
possible under the Glackin "zoning by referendum" approach
created a high likelihood that courts would use the due process
and equal protection clauses to invalidate any Chicago zoning laws
based on the Glackin approach.
In December of 1919, shortly after the Glackin Law was
passed in Springfield, the Chicago Real Estate Board convened a
two-day conference of leading zoning advocates and attorneys from
around the country. One of the principal topics was the relative
merits of Glackin-based neighborhood referendum zoning and
other piecemeal zoning methods compared to city-wide zoning.6 5
Bassett was one of the principal speakers. 66 He urged
comprehensive, city-wide zoning as the only constitutionally
defensible approach to controlling land uses. More than 400
persons attended the banquet for the event at the Morrison

59. THOMAS S. HINES, BURNHAM OF CHICAGO: ARCHITECT AND PLANNER,
113 (Univ. Chi. Press, 2d ed., 2009).
60. Id. at 269.
61. See The Flatiron Building, http://www.nyc-architecture.com/GRP/
GRP024.htm (last visited Apr. 6. 2010) (listing Daniel H. Burnham & Co. as
the architect).
62. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 144.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id.
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Hotel.67 "Few events in Chicago history were as significant to the
evolution of the city's land-use policies . . . ."68
The Morrison Hotel conference accelerated the push for
zoning in Chicago. Two months later in February 1920, the city
created a Chicago Zoning Commission to draft a city-wide zoning
code in the expectation that the state legislation would be
amended to allow such laws.69 The Chicago Real Estate Board
created a new zoning committee and retained New York's Edward
Bassett as its legal counsel to draft the Chicago ordinance.70
The 1919 meeting, and Bassett's inspiring leadership, even
convinced Senator Glackin that his 1919 State Zoning Enabling
Act needed amendments.7 1 In June of 1921, the state legislature
repealed the Glackin Law and replaced it with a Zoning Enabling
Act drafted by the Chicago Real Estate Board special committee
under the guidance of Edward Bassett. 72
Meanwhile, the Chicago Zoning Commission had also been
pressing on with its work. In April of 1922, it widely distributed
Zoning Chicago, its booklet summarizing the purposes of a zoning
code and its legal basis. Both Edward M. Bassett and Burnham's
1909 Plan co-author Edward M. Bennett were consultants to the
Commission. In April of 1923, the City Council adopted Chicago's
comprehensive zoning ordinance. It was immediately hailed by one
Chicago alderman as "[t]he greatest thing in the way of progress
which Chicago has done in fifty years."73
It still remained to be seen if the Illinois courts would uphold
the constitutionality of the new Chicago zoning ordinance.
Challenges to the Evanston and Aurora zoning codes, adopted in
1921 and May, 1923 (respectively),' worked their way up to the
Illinois Supreme Court before Chicago's zoning code. In February
of 1925, the court issued a draft opinion in the Aurora challenge
case "saying that a law that prohibited new uses in an area where
similar existing uses were allowed to remain violated the state
constitution's prohibition against special legislation. Only if an
ordinance limited each district to a specific use or uses could it be
upheld."74 The court feared that already established but now
nonconforming uses were being granted a monopoly privilege by
operation of law.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 18.
69. Id. at 19.
70. Id. at 19, 144.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id.
73. Council Votes Zoning Law at Final Session, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1923, at
Al.
74. Bosselman, supra note 46, at 577. According to Professor Bosselman,
the original draft opinion can only be found now at 57 Chi. Legal News, Feb.

26, 1925.
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It looked like the Illinois courts were about to overturn all of
the work done since 1913 to gain public and property owner
support to replace frontage laws with a zoning code. After a
rehearing was granted to Aurora, however, on December 16, 1925,
the Court issued its official final decision in City of Aurora v.
Burns.7 5 The Illinois Supreme Court had changed its mind. Zoning
was legally sound: "Zoning necessarily involves a consideration of
the community as a whole and a comprehensive view of its
needs." 76
The court said that no monopoly was created because other
districts in the zoning code of Aurora allowed for the operation of
the uses prohibited and made nonconforming in some districts.
The court put some limits on the zoning authority, however.
Communities must take care in mapping districts: "[a]n arbitrary
creation of districts, without regard to existing conditions or future
growth and development, is not a proper exercise of the police
power and is not sustainable."7 7
The court also found a sound policy basis for the limitations
that zoning imposed on private property: "the growing complexity
of our civilization make it necessary for the State, either directly
or through some public agency by its sanction, to limit individual
activities to a greater extent than formerly."78
On the same day, the Illinois Supreme Court also upheld the
Evanston zoning code in Deynzer v. City of Evanston.7 9 After a
sixteen year battle, the judicial limitations on local government
exercise of the police power that had caused Walter Fisher to
doubt that Illinois courts would ever uphold "districting" had been
removed. Despite his pessimism, a concerted effort by the legal
community in tandem with the real estate community had won the
day. And after the decision of the United States Supreme Court
upholding the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realtyso less than a year later, frontal attacks
on the general constitutional validity of zoning in Illinois were no
longer possible. Implementation of the Burnham Plan vision of
regulating uses for the benefit of Chicago's citizens was now
clearly legally possible.81
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 790 (111. 1925).
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id.
Deynzer v. City of Evanston, 149 N.E. 790, 793 (Ill. 1925).

80. 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
81. Bassett moved on to work on zoning codes in other cities after 1923.
Edward Bennett continued to stay involved in implementation of the zoning
code and indirectly the 1909 Plan through his continuing role as consulting
architect to the Chicago Plan Commission. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra
note 40, at 19. The Plan Commission had been created in the wake of the
1909 Plan of Chicago to generate the public support for the public funding
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BUILDING HEIGHT LIMITS AND DOWNTOWN
CHICAGO'S ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTER

Chicago's skyline is a testament to the famed architects . . .. Yet the
city's silhouette is also the product of many years of regulation
governing the location, height, and contours of its buildings. 82
The most visible way in which law has served as a hidden
architecture in the development of Chicago since 1909 is in the
manner in which the city has dealt with building height. The
soaring height of downtown Chicago buildings was a controversial
civic issue in 1909 and in the decades immediately preceding and
after the adoption of the Plan of Chicago.
For example, in 1893, Chicago had imposed a height limit of
130 feet on downtown buildings. 83 This was couched primarily as a
safety regulation to "protect the public from the risk of fire and
falling debris"84 as well as to preserve light and air to streets
clogged with horse drawn vehicles and the resulting manure.
Buildings taller than ten stories, it was believed, would block
sunlight, trap odors and keep winds from clearing the air. "Some
streets seemed destined to become dark and dangerous 'skyscraper
canyons' that were incubators for germs." 85
This 130-foot height limit was vigorously opposed by the real
estate development community.86 The ten-story limit was actually
lower than the height of some recently built skyscrapers such as
Burnham's Monadnock Building and Jenney's Manhattan
Building (both sixteen stories in height) and Sullivan and Adler's
Auditorium Theater, at seventeen stories, the world's tallest
building when it was completed in 1890. These buildings were
substantially taller than the typical five to seven-story buildings
constructed in the wake of the Chicago Fire. Ever taller buildings
had been made technologically possible and economically feasible
by the perfection of the light-weight steel frame skeleton used by
William LeBaron Jenney and others in the late 1880s combined
with the invention of the electric elevator by Samuel Otis.
necessary to build the infrastructure components of the Burnham plan. Id. at
11.
82. Id. at 79.
83. ROBERT M. FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 1880-1950 143
(Yale Univ. Press, 1st ed., 2001). Such building heights, however, were
applied uniformly across the city. The framers of the legal Appendix to the
1909 Plan of Chicago questioned the legality of establishing differing height
limits in differing parts of the city. It was not until the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of zoning in 1925 that a clear basis for differing
building heights in various parts of the city obtained a firm legal grounding.
See generally Burns, 149 N.E. 784 (upholding a zoning ordinance for the city of
Aurora).
84. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPAL, supra note 40, at 9.
85. Id. at 80.
86. Id. at 9.
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Chicago's height limit of 1893 was "the first of its kind in the
United States . . . ."87 This was a significant expansion of the
nuisance laws. 88 But the new ordinance exempted from its
coverage several buildings that already had received their permits
including Burnham's Reliance Building and Masonic Temple
building at State and Randolph, which, when completed in 1894,
was the tallest building in the world at 302 feet and 20 stories.89
By the time the Plan of Chicago was published in 1909, the
real estate community had successfully doubled the height limit to
260 feet.90 They argued successfully that such advances as the
electric street car and growing number of automobiles reduced the
number of horses and reduced the odor and air problem that
accompanied horsedrawn public conveyances. Therefore, taller
buildings should be allowed.
The Burnham Plan of 1909 was based on an aesthetic that
subjugated building height to a uniform, European style cornice
height. The Jules Guerin drawings show mile after mile of
Parisian style classical buildings of a symmetrical height. The
Burnham Plan proposed a maximum height limitation across the
entire City of Chicago of 240 feet-about fourteen stories.9 1
In the middle of the decade of the 1910s, following the
publication of the Plan of Chicago, however, the maximum height
limit was reduced back to 200 feet. 92 These height limits based on
public nuisance theories had a fundamental impact on the
appearance of downtown Chicago. Limitations on height combined
with a shortage of office space pushed developers to acquire large
quarter block sites, build to the maximum height allowed, and add
interior light wells to get around the problem created by
constructing buildings on such large sites.93 Burnham's Railway
Exchange (Santa Fe) Building and Peoples Gas Building on
Michigan Avenue, as well the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on
LaSalle are examples of these massive buildings with internal
light wells.94
The reduction to 200 feet was short-lived. In 1920, the height
limit was again increased to 260 feet but ornamental towers-as
87. Id. at 80.
88. Municipal officials used the concept of nuisance laws to limit the
activity of builders. Id. at 9. The 1893 height limit on downtown buildings
was to protect the public from the risk of fire or falling debris. Id.
89. Others also grandfathered in included the Fisher Building, Old Colony
Building and Marquette Building still standing on Dearborn Street, and each
at least seventeen stories tall. Id. at 81.
90. Id.
91. KENNETH HALPERN, DOWNTOWN USA: URBAN DESIGN IN NINE
AMERICAN CITIES 79 (Whitney Library of Design, 1978).
92. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPAL, supra note 40, at 81.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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long as they were not occupied-could rise to 400 feet.95 This
restriction was short-lived also. The first Chicago zoning ordinance
adopted in 1923 (to be discussed later) increased the height limit
from 260 to 264 feet but allowed useable towers without any
limitation on height to be added.9 6 However, there was a practical
limit on the height of these towers imposed by other provisions in
the zoning code-the footprint of such towers could be no more
than one-fourth of the footprint of the building and could not
contain more than one-sixth of the volume of the non-tower
portions of the building.9 7
The 1920 and 1923 "tower provisions" are responsible for the
design appearance of some of Chicago's most iconic landmarks
including the Wrigley Building, built in two sections (and
connected by a sky bridge) in 1921 and 1924, and the Tribune
Tower, built from 1923-25.98 On larger sites, some of these socalled "zoning-law towers" built in the 1920s, such as the fortyfive-story 1929 Civic Opera House, could soar to over 550 feet and
a few even rose to over 600 feet, such as the Board of Trade
Building built in 1930.99 The Great Depression of the 1930s
effectively put an end to the era of the "Twenties Towers" but not
before nearly two dozen of such tall buildings had been
constructed downtown.100 For the next almost twenty-five years,
the Board of Trade would reign as Chicago's tallest building as the
Depression and World War II put an end to downtown commercial
development following the completion of the 535-foot Field
Building (also known as LaSalle National Bank) in 1935.101

Chicago's downtown streetscape changed little between the
mid-years of the Great Depression and the mid-1950s.
It was not until 1952 that construction began on another
Chicago downtown skyscraper, the forty-four-story Prudential
Building. In the interim, Chicago had made a change to the
downtown height restrictions-a 1942 revision to the basic 1923
zoning code added a "bulk limit" on buildings. The limit effectively
restricted the useable floor area of a building to about twelve times
the lot area. But there was no restriction on height. A twenty-fourstory building could be built if only half the site was used and a
102
forty-eight-story building constructed on a quarter of the site.
95. Id. at 83.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 84.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. A block building covering the entire site could only rise twelve stories,
but a block building covering half the site could rise about twenty-four stories.
Id. at 85. The zoning code bulk limitation was lot area multiplied by 144. Id.
These concepts, taken in consideration with contemporary construction trends,
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The developers of the Prudential Building were able to build to its
height by acquiring a substantially larger site and then leaving
much of it undeveloped. Only a few other buildings in downtown
Chicago, including the Continental Insurance Building on Wacker
Drive and the Inland Steel Building at the corner of Monroe and
Dearborn, were built under this volume control system that was
replaced by a new set of height regulations in the comprehensive
1957 Chicago Zoning Ordinance.10 3
In 1957, volume limits were replaced by a system specifying a
floor area ratio, commonly called FAR, for various zoning districts.
In the 1950s, the effective 12.0 FAR in the 1942 zoning code was
perceived to be too restrictive. Post-war America was booming,
and the demand for downtown office space in Chicago was soaring.
In 1957, the prior volume limit of 144 times lot area was replaced
by a specific FAR limitation. In downtown Chicago, the specified
FAR was 16.0, but developers could provide "amenities" and in
exchange could receive floor area bonuses, a technique that was
routinely used over the next twenty-five years in downtown
Chicago resulting in a significant change in the character and
appearance of downtown Chicago and its streetscape.
This new law reflected the input from Chicago architects who
believed that street level sunlight gained from upper floor setbacks
"was more theoretical than real . . . ."104 It also reflected the
influence of Mies van der Rohe then directing the architecture
program at IIT. Upper floor setbacks were anathema to the ascetic
of his sleek modernist boxes such as the Seagram Building then
under construction in New York or the Inland Steel Building in
Chicago. The influence of Miesian theory on Chicago School
architects in the 1950s was such that bonuses for upper floor
setbacks were supplemented by other types of bonuses in a
deliberate rejection of New York's continuing adherence to the
earlier 1920s wedding cake approach to providing "breathing
room" at street level.
The bonus system provided additional floor area for so-called
"amenities" such as sidewalk arcades (effectively recessed first
floors under overhanging upper floors), public plazas (such as the
one in front of the Daley Center), and ground level setbacks.
These were in addition to the more traditional amenities of upper
story setbacks that had been in play in Chicago since the 1920s
and proximity to public open spaces such as the Chicago River.
Architects began to design Miesian modernist structures such
as The John Hancock Building, the First National Bank Building,
the Standard Oil Building (now Aon Building) and the Equitable

resulted in "the equivalent of a FAR of about 12." Id.
103. Id.
104. HALPERN, supra note 91, at 79.
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Building adjacent to the Tribune Tower on Michigan Avenue
which were, in effect, pieces of sculpture set back from the street
on one or more sides where large open plazas not only created
height and floor area bonuses, but allowed the architect's work to
be viewed clearly. The result was another stunning architectural
flowering in downtown Chicago. Architects in the 1960s and 1970s
at Skidmore Owings & Merrill, C. S. Murphy (later Murphy/Jahn),
Perkins & Will, and other Chicago design shops once again put
Chicago at the center of the world of architecture, at least in the
design of tall, downtown buildings.
By the early 1970s, however, critics were charging that
Chicago's comparatively high base FAR of 16.0105 and
plaza/setback bonus system were turning Chicago into a series of
full-block megaliths that threatened to "completely destroy what
remains of the humane scale of the street." 0 6 If a site was large
enough-such as in the case of Sears (now Willis) Tower that
occupied a whole city block' 07-and the developer compiled enough
amenity bonuses, the only restriction on the height of a building
was the landing pattern at O'Hare Airport! 08 Prominent architect
Jack Hartray, Jr. summed up Chicago's downtown zoning as
"boomtown zoning that lets you build a Sears Tower on every
block." 09 Mary Decker, Executive Director of the Metropolitan
Planning Council, described the situation as follows: "We have the
most permissive zoning ordinance in America .

. .

. All developers

have to do is include a plaza here, a setback there, and they can
build to the angels."" 0
According to Paul Gapp, Architecture Critic for the CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, the root of the problem was in Chicago politics. "As long
as Chicago's real estate developers enjoy the most lucrative zoning

105. Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Washington D.C. and New York had
FAR limits ranging from 10-15, and Atlanta and San Francisco had even
higher FAR limits. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 90.
Eventually, though, each of these cities lowered their FAR limits to levels
lower than Chicago's. Id.
106. HALPERN, supra note 91, at 81.
107. The use of full city-block sites, a common practice in the 1960s, was
unexpected and unanticipated. Id. at 79. Halpern explains that
[o]n a full block site, by setting the building back on all four sides, by
providing a continuous arcade at the base of the building, and by also
providing building setbacks, the building could reach an FAR of at least
40, which would allow a structurally sound 140-story building
containing about 6,000,000 square feet (550,000 square meters) on each
block in the central area.
Id. at 79.
108. Id. at 81. This was not foreseen at the time the 1957 zoning ordinance
was enacted. Id. at 79.
109. John McCarron, Chicago Needs Zoning Reform to Help its New Growth
Complement the Old, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 1987, at 1.
110. Id.
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ordinance in the country, thanks to politicians without conscience
or vision, this city will continue to produce new warts and
blemishes to mar the effect of its architectural achievements.""'
The Chicago architectural community had lost its Hamiltonian
democratic ideals that had inspired it to prevail against the
pedestrian aesthetic of the political establishment.
The public plazas surrounding many of these 1970s vintage
architectural sculptures came to embody the problems with
Chicago zoning and the loss of the Burnham vision. Many of these
plazas were windswept little used waste lands. The small public
plaza on the Chicago River at the base of Mies Van der Rohe's
iconic IBM Building at 405 N. Wabash was-and is still-so windy
that on blustery days, building management puts out a series of
ropes anchored to stanchions. Tenants approaching the building
must haul themselves hand-over-hand into the building like
mountain climbers ascending the last 200 meters of Mount
Everest!
Studies in New York in the 1970s by William H. Whyte' 1 2 of
how public plazas work-and how they do not work-in attracting
people and pedestrian activities exposed the fallacy that an open
area around the base of a building, by itself, can be an important
public improvement. Through time lapse photography and by
simply watching people and how they use public parks and plazas,
Whyte began to understand good design principles for public
spaces.11 The plaza surrounding the Sears Tower came in for
particularly harsh criticism in Chicago. Whyte summed up the
relationship between zoning and these dead city center spaces as
follows:
[Z]oning is certainly not the ideal way to achieve the better design of
spaces. It ought to be done for its own sake. For economics alone, it

makes sense. An enormous expenditure of design expertise, and of
travertine and steel, went into the creation of the many really bum
14
office-building plazas around the country. To what end?1

What was happening to the streetscape of downtown Chicago
began to be noticed all around the world and "Chicago style"
development began to be used in a denigrating fashion in
Europe.115

111. Paul Gapp, An Architect's View: What's Good and Bad Downtown, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 27, 1978, at A4.
112. See generally WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SMALL URBAN
SPACES, (Project for Public Spaces 1980) (recapping Whyte's study of New
York plazas and how they fit into urban planning and design).
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 15.
115. For example, Charles Prince of Wales, in one of his campaigns against
constructing new modernist buildings in the heart of London, reportedly said
that "[i]t would be a tragedy if the character and skyline of our capital city

2010]

Law as Hidden Architecture

399

Various efforts to change the rules related to building height
and bulk in downtown Chicago and along the lakefront failed
during the last few years of Mayor Richard J. Daley's term in office
and during the terms of Mayor Bilandic and Mayor Jane Byrne.
With the election of Mayor Harold Washington in 1983, the
Planning Department led by Planning Commissioner Elizabeth
Hollander began to consider a comprehensive rewrite of the zoning
code including its height and bonus system. She and her Planning
Department
staff, including former
American Planning
Association staff member David Mosena, understood the
important insight first enunciated in Chicago in the Burnham and
Bennett plan of 1909 that: "the quality of our built environment
depends as much on such inherently dull things as FARs as it does
on the dramatic conceptualizations of architects."" 6
However, the political divide between Mayor Washington and
the City Council made systematic reform of the zoning code
Hollander
politically impossible. 117 Instead, Commissioner
expanded the authority of the Planning Department by an
administrative directive that scrapped the existing height and
bonus system in downtown Chicago. She substituted an informal
and somewhat ad hoc "negotiated" bonus system based on the
planned development provisions in the 1957 Chicago Zoning
Ordinance. Developers were "encouraged" to present their projects
to the city as planned developments, also call PDs or PUDs.118
This allowed the Planning Department to trade floor area bonuses
for such additional public amenities as "interior cultural space,
rooftop gardens, and 'winter gardens"' or for actual contributions
of funds for neighborhood improvements.' 1 9
With the election of Mayor Richard M. Daley in 1989 the
years of fractious "council wars" came to an end.120 Unlike his

were to be further ruined and St. Paul's dwarfed by yet another giant glass
stump, better suited to downtown Chicago than the City of London." JOHN
RATCLIFFE ET AL., URBAN PLANNING AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 213
(UCL Press 2009) (1996).
116. Gapp, supra note 111.
117. Chicago during that period was sometimes described as "Beirut by the
lake" in tribute to the internecine "council wars" between Mayor Washington's
supporters and opponents in the Chicago City Council. See Larry Green,
ChicagoMayor Wins Backing to Defeat Machine, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1986, at
3 (discussing how the Wall Street Journal dubbed Chicago "Beirut by the
Lake" in connection to the "council wars").
118. The planned unit development (PUD) provision of the Chicago Zoning
Code was added in the early 1960s to accommodate Marina City, a mixed use
project built in 1964 that did not conform to the provisions of the 1957 code.
119. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 90.
120. See
Council
Wars,
Encyclopedia
of
Chicago,
http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/342.html
(last visited Apr. 6,
2010) (describing the council wars as Mayor Harold Washington battling to
assert his power against the city council's majority block).
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father, who was intently focused on large scale physical planning
and major public works projects 12 1-macro-planning-the second
Mayor Daley also understood the aesthetics and nuances of what
makes a street, a neighborhood and a city "work"-micro-planning.
Planning commissioners David Mosena and Valerie Jarrett under
the second Mayor Daley continued the work of their predecessor
Elizabeth Hollander.
Although the time was now right for a new set of bonus and
height regulations, it took until 1998 for the city to devise a new
bonus system and until October of 2001 for the City Council to add
it as an amendment to the 1957 zoning code. Many of the
amenities routinely traded for density in the ad hoc planned
development bargaining of the 1980s and 1990s now officially
became part of the bonus system. Other codified bonuses now
included riverwalks, public art, adopt-a-landmark, and throughblock connections. "For PDs, the bonus system was now akin to a
restaurant menu, allowing developers to choose from a broad list
of amenities subject to planning department approval." 22
The coming of the Great Recession in 2008 meant many
proposed downtown Chicago development projects were cancelled
or put on hold.123 The last building completed during the Great
Depression was the Field Building on LaSalle Street in 1935. The
last building completed during the Great Recession was the
Trump International Hotel and Tower on the north side of the
Chicago River at Wabash in 2009.
The Field Building is one of the finest expressions of art deco
design as allowed by the 1923 zoning code with its height limits.
The Trump Tower is a great but not perfect expression of how the
new bonus for amenity exchange system embodied in the 2004
Chicago Zoning Code can result in a design that incorporates the
best of the Burnham vision for the relationship between
architecture and the public. The Trump Tower's well designed
riverfront park and upper level setbacks respectful of neighboring
buildings results in a quality piece of urban design. It embodies
how zoning and planning law since the Burnham Plan of 1909 has
evolved to assure that Chicago's architecture relates to its setting
and its people even when expressed in one of the tallest buildings
in the city.
The Great Recession, like the Great Depression, will result in
121. See Daley's Chicago, Encyclopedia of Chicago, http://www.encyclopedia.
chicagohistory.org/pages/1722.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (explaining how
Richard J. Daley oversaw many building projects that included creating the
Chicago skyline, completing the expressways, expanding O'Hare International
Airport, and constructing University of Illinois at Chicago - Chicago Circle).
122. SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 40, at 90.
123. One project, the Mandarin Oriental hotel/condo project on Wacker
Drive, was stopped in mid-construction.
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another long pause in downtown Chicago development. This time
the pause will likely be shorter than the twenty year gap between
completion of the Field Building in 1935 and the start of
construction on the Prudential Building. But, the pause gives
Chicago another chance to reassess its recent development history
and measure its success against more than economics. It allows
Chicago to again take stock of the Burnham ideal for how
buildings should relate to the street and the city to which they
belong. The importance of this periodic reassessment may have
been put best by Blair Kamin, current Architecture Critic for the
CHICAGO TRIBUNE: "For it is only by analyzing what we have built
today that we can better grasp what to design tomorrow."124
V.

THE BURNHAM PLAN AND GRANT PARK-BURNHAM'S
VISION LOST ... AND FOUND AGAIN

The most common misconception about the Burnham/Bennett
1909 Plan of Chicago is that it contains Burnham's famous
statement about "making no little plans." 25 But those words are
not in the Plan but rather from a Burnham speech given on
another occasion. 126
The second biggest misconception about the 1909 Plan is that
it prohibited any construction in Grant Park or along Chicago's
lakefront. That also is not true. Burnham actually wanted
buildings in Grant Park, although buildings in a park-like
setting.127 The Plan envisioned the Field Museum of Natural
History where Buckingham Fountain is today. 128 It also envisioned
two other major structures, one to the north, as well as one to the
south, and some smaller structures at the southwest corner of
Grant Park.
As shown in the illustrations in the 1909 Plan of Chicago,
these Grant Park structures were to be designed in the Beaux Arts
style. As in so many other ways, Burnham and Bennett's
inspiration for these classically inspired buildings in a park
setting was most likely Paris.
Grant Park was to be the "intellectual center of Chicago."129
The Field Museum was to be built here as would a major
library."s0 The Art Institute, already in place on the Michigan
124. BLAIR KAMIN, WHY ARCHITECTURE MATTERS: LESSONS FROM CHICAGO
xvi (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001).
125. See supra, note 21 and accompanying text (giving the "make no little
plans" quotation and citation).
126. There is considerable disagreement as to the origin of the quote.
127. See PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 115 (proposing to keep building
related to the arts grouped together).
128. Id. at 114.
129. Id. at 112.
130. The Crerar Library, originally to be in Grant Park, was eventually later
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Avenue edge of the park, would be relocated further east and
expanded significantly. 13 1
Grant Park was also to be a great gathering place for public
recreation and festivals:
as Michigan Avenue is widened and extended, the great traffic
which this thoroughfare is sure to bear will come to require large
open spaces for gatherings of people to witness parades and
pageants ... and at gala times, when the harbor is illuminated, the
terraces of Grant Park will afford unsurpassed views of the
spectacle. Such pleasures make a universal appeal, and give charm
and brightness to the life of people who must of necessity pass long
summers in the city. 132
But there were three obstacles to accomplishing Burnham's
Grant Park vision. One was physical. One was political. The third
was legal.
The physical problem was that Grant Park existed in name
only in 1909. Before 1901, the area immediately east of Michigan
Avenue was called Lake Park. Until the Chicago Fire of 1871,
Lake Michigan lapped right up to the edge of Michigan Avenue.
After the fire, much of the rubble from the ruined city was dumped
into the shallows of the lake in what is now Streeterville and
Grant Park. By 1882, the area between Michigan Avenue and the
Illinois Central Railroad trestle had been essentially filled.
Between 1897 and 1907, additional work was undertaken to fill in
another area east of the railroad trestle. The name of the park was
changed from Lake Park to Grant Park in 1901. For years, the
lakefront immediately east of Michigan Avenue and south of the
Chicago River was "an unsightly mess . . . littered with stables,

squatters' shacks, a firehouse, garbage, and debris."133 There were
broken wagons, remnants of a traveling circus and "the ruins of a
monstrous old exhibition hall."134
The political problem was that the City of Chicago and its
ward politicians not only had their eyes on Lake Park/Grant Park
but treated it as their personal turf for political rallies .

.

. and

more notorious events. "Hinky Dink" Kenna threw regular
political bashes on the rubble strewn area east of Michigan
Avenue. This was not a gathering like the one that celebrated the
election of Barack Obama in Grant Park in November of 2008.

built at the northwest corner of Michigan and Randolph across the street from
the Chicago Public Library. It now sits in Hyde Park. CrerarLibrary, John,
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/
Encyclopedia of Chicago,
348.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
131. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supranote 1, at 110.

132. Id. at 111.
133. SMITH, supra note 2, at 24.
134. LOis WILLE, FOREVER OPEN, CLEAR, AND FREE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CHICAGO'S LAKEFRONT 73 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2d ed., 1991).
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Instead, Kenna's parties in the park were an early twentieth
century Chicago cross between Mardi Gras, the Roman Colosseum,
and Wrestlemania featuring beer tents, a masquerade ball,
wrestling and boxing matches, dog fights, circuses, and other
assorted entertainments including appearances by Chicago's most
notorious madams from the infamous Levee district accompanied
by official police department escort.135 When church and civic
leaders complained about Kenna's lakefront parties, he simply
responded "Chicago ain't no sissy town."136 He was absolutely
right.
The other part of the political problem was that the City of
Chicago had plans to build public buildings on the lands east of
Michigan Avenue. As of 1897, the city already had a firehouse, a
post office and an armory located east of Michigan Avenue, and it
wanted to build a new city hall there. 137 In addition, the city saw
that land as an economic gold mine-fill it in, level it, and sell it
off. A downtown lake front is "no place for a park," said Alderman
William Ballard. "It should be used to bring revenue to the city." 138
It would be politically difficult to keep the city from selling
additional new land created on fill east of Michigan Avenue.
The legal problems were the most complicated. In 1852, the
city had given the Illinois Central Railroad the legal right to
extend its tracks north of 22nd Street on a 300 foot wide right of
way in the shallows of Lake Michigan. The railroad would build a
trestle above the shallow water.13 9 The trestle was required to be
400 feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue, putting it a few
hundred yards off-shore. 140 It was that land between the trestle
and Michigan Avenue that was filled in with rubble from the
Chicago Fire. By 1890, additional fill had been added at various
places along the Chicago shoreline both north and south of the
Chicago River. The Illinois Central had also purchased a
significant tract of land along the south bank of the Chicago River
east of Michigan Avenue and developed a series of freight yards,
grain elevators, and locomotive shops.

135. Id. at 74.
136. Id.
137. SMITH, supra note 2, at 25.
138. WILLE, supra note 134, at 75.
139. This right had been granted to the Illinois Central Railroad in exchange
for their promise to make the trestle a breakwater as well. Id. at 26. The
construction of a pier at the mouth of the Chicago River a few blocks further
north had changed the pattern of sand distribution south of the river. Id.
Lake Michigan storms were eating away at the shoreline along South
Michigan Avenue, threatening to destroy the mansions that had been built on
the Lake Michigan beach. Id.
140. Id. at 28. However, the shoreline was constantly shifting, creating
some interesting legal problems at the core of the first of the later lawsuits
filed by Montgomery Ward. Id. at 74-76.
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The railroad deal and the trestle and breakwater had been
built despite two important inscriptions that had been noted on
official subdivision maps for land along the lakefront between
Roosevelt on the south and Randolph on the north. 141 The first was
the notation "[plublic ground . . . [florever to remain vacant of

buildings" on the 1839 subdivision maps of the marshy land east of
Michigan Avenue between Madison Street and Randolph.142 The
second was the inscription "Open ground . .. [n] o building" on the

lakeside edge of subdivision maps of the land south of Madison
Street to Roosevelt. 143 According to the Illinois Supreme Court,
this inscription was put on the subdivision map "as an
inducement" and assurance to purchasers of lakefront land that
"there would be no buildings to obstruct the view of the lake."1 4 4
In 1890, however, the dry goods baron Montgomery Ward
decided he had to do something about Lake Park. He had just built
his new office headquarters at the northwest corner of Madison
and Michigan. His office looked out over the mess that was Lake
Park. He did not like what he saw. He was as disturbed as much
or more by the political rabble as the physical rubble in the park.
Shortly after moving in, he reportedly turned to his legal counsel
George P. Merrick and said "Merrick, this is a damned shame! Go
and do something about it."145 It took twenty years, but George
Merrick eventually did do something about it.
The first thing Merrick did was file a lawsuit to "clear the
lakefront .

.

. of unsightly wooden shanties, structures, garbage,

paving blocks and other refuse piled thereon." 146 He also sought an
injunction to stop the city from building any more public buildings
east of Michigan Avenue. The city corporation counsel replied to

141. As interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the city and the Illinois
Central had agreed that the Lake Park open ground restrictions did not
extend that far out into lake where the trestle was to be built. The agreement
also placed other restrictions on the Illinois Central: it was prohibited from
erecting any
buildings between the north line of Randolph street and the south line of
Lake Park, nor place upon any part of their works between these points
any obstructions to the view of the lake from the shore, and that it
should make and keep open through its works such culverts or ways as
would afford room for the uninterrupted flow of water from the open
lake to the space inside of the inner or west line of the railroad right-ofway.
City of Chicago v. Ward et. al., 48 N.E. 927, 931 (Ill. 1897).
142. Ward, 48 N.E. at 930. Lois Wille, in her book, states that this
inscription simply said "public ground." WILLE, supra note 134, at 22.
143. Ward, 48 N.E. at 930. According to Lois Wille, the inscription read
"Public Ground - A Common to Remain Forever Open, Clear and Free of any
Buildings or other Obstruction Whatever." WILLE, supra note 134, at 23.
144. Ward, 48 N.E. at 930.
145. WILLE, supra note 134, at 71.
146. Id. at 74.
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the count in the suit related to public buildings with two legal
arguments. First, the notations on the 1830s plat maps clearly
allowed public uses east of Michigan Avenue and such buildings as
a civic center were a public use. Second, the areas on the maps
that were underwater in the 1830s but had now been filled in by
the City of Chicago out to the Illinois Central trestle, were exempt
from the restrictions related to "public grounds" being forever
open, clear and free. 147 The corporation counsel also argued that
after the inscriptions were made, the shoreline had changed due to
continuing erosion of the lakefront, and the lands that had been
subsequently submerged were also exempt from the restriction. 148
Ward won and the city lost in the trial court. Merrick got a
permanent injunction prohibiting anyone, including the city, from
building on the land east of Michigan Avenue1 49 "or using it for
anything but a public park."150
The city appealed, and the case slowly worked its way up to
the Illinois Supreme Court. Ward offered to pay for the
construction of the park if the city would drop its appeal. The city
151
refused. In 1897, in City of Chicago v. A. Montgomery Ward, the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Montgomery Ward.
A few years later, George Merrick, again on behalf of
Montgomery Ward, filed another lawsuit, this time to stop the City
of Chicago from building an armory in Lake Park/Grant Park. The
proposed armory was to be east of the Illinois Central tracks in an
area where the city had been filling the lake. Ward prevailed in
the trial court and obtained an injunction stopping construction.
The city appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court in 1902 in Bliss
v. A. Montgomery Ward1 52 upheld the trial court decision. While
the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the city had obtained
147. Id. (emphasis added). The argument appears to be that since the areas
that had been filled were submerged in the 1830s, they were not "grounds"
when the inscription was written on the maps.
148. Ward, 48 N.E. at 932.
149. The Illinois Supreme Court also emphasized the significance of two
pieces of state legislation passed in the 1860s to prohibit the City of Chicago
from granting other railroads the right to build trestles across the ponds
between the Illinois Central trestle and Michigan Avenue. One of the laws
specifically stated that
the state of Illinois, by its canal commissioners, having declared that the
public grounds east of said lots should forever remain open and vacant,
neither the common council of the city of Chicago, nor any other
authority, shall ever have the power to permit encroachments thereon,
without the assent of all the person owning lots or land on said street or
avenue.

Id.
150.
would
151.
152.

WILLE, supra note 134, at 74. This is not quite accurate as later cases

specifically state that public "use" did not imply a public "park."
Ward, 48 N.E. at 937.
64 N.E. 705, 709 (Ill. 1902).
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the legal right from the state to fill in land east of the Illinois
Central tracks, it upheld the trial court prohibition of construction
of any "building or structure" based upon the public trust created
by the same survey map notations 15 3 that formed the basis for the
first Ward decision. 154

In 1903, the state legislature passed legislation authorizing
park districts to construct and maintain museums in their parks.
A few weeks later, the City of Chicago enacted an ordinance giving
the South Park Commission complete jurisdiction over Grant
Park.155 In 1906, Marshall Field died and in his will left $8 million
for construction of a museum of natural history. Shortly
thereafter, the South Park Commissioners reached agreement
with the administrators of the Field estate to construct the
museum in Grant Park, on the approximate location where
Buckingham Fountain is located today.156 George Merrick, on
behalf of Montgomery Ward, filed suit once again. And once again
the case went all the way to the Illinois Supreme Court, which, for
the third time, ruled in favor of Montgomery Ward in A.
Montgomery Ward v. Field Museum of NaturalHistory.15 7
The decision in Field Museum was issued on October 26,
1909, less than four months after publication of Burnham's Plan of
Chicago. The Plan clearly showed the Field Museum in the center
of Grant Park. Burnham and the Commercial Club were of course
well aware of Ward's litigation as it progressed through the
courts.158 They went forward with the Grant Park plan anyway
153. The underlying rationale was that deliberate filling by the city should
be treated the same as natural accretions. A. Montgomery Ward v. Field
Museum, 89 N.E. 731, 734 (Ill. 1909).
154. Bliss, 64 N.E. at 709. This lawsuit by Montgomery Ward infuriated
many of the civic and business leaders of Chicago. Construction of an armory
was vitally important to them given the riots and labor violence in Chicago
during the 1890s.
155. Field Museum, 89 N.E. at 735. An earlier city ordinance in July of 1896
gave the South Park Commission jurisdiction over portions of the park north
of Jackson Street between Michigan Avenue and the railroad right-of-way as
well as portions east of the railroad north of Monroe Street and extending east
to the outer sea wall. The 1896 ordinance also reserved to the city, however,
land for the proposed Field Columbian Museum and for an Illinois National
Guard armory. Id. at 734. This new ordinance also removed the site of the
Art Institute, the Crerar Library, and a monument to Dr. Samuel Guthrie,
inventor of chloroform, from the jurisdiction of the South Park Commission.
Id. at 735.
156. The specific location of the Field Columbian Museum in Grant Park had
been specifically set aside in the ordinance of 1896 granting jurisdiction of
part of the park to the South Park Commission. Id. at 735.
157. Id. at 737.
158. The city had also launched a suit of its own to stop Ward by
"condemning away" the easement held by Ward and other Michigan Avenue
property owners. See South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery Ward and
Company, 93 N.E. 910 (Ill. 1910) (ruling that the type of easement created by
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convinced that Ward would not stand in the way of Marshall
Field's $8 million bequest for a museum. Marshall Field's will had
stipulated that the bequest was contingent upon the city
furnishing a site, free of charge, for the museum.
The public outcry against Montgomery Ward was vociferous.
The CHICAGO TRIBUNE called him a "human icicle."159 Others
comments were less metaphorical and more scatological. Partly in
response to his public critics during the Chicago debate leading up
to the Field Museum decision, Ward offered to contribute funds to
buy land elsewhere for the museum. The Field Estate refused. 160
The battle that Montgomery Ward won had been a contest
between two contrasting visions for Chicago's lakefront park. As
Blair Kamin of the CHICAGO TRIBUNE and many before him have
commented, "[o]ur front yard, the lakeshore is the face Chicago
presents to the world."16 1 Montgomery Ward, after his final victory
in the Field Museum case gave his only public interview related to
litigation to keep Grant Park open. 162 He said "I fought for the
poor people of Chicago, not the millionaires."1 63 He envisioned
Grant Park as open space for the 250,000 people, mostly poor, who
lived between 22nd Street on the south and Chicago Avenue on the
north and Halsted on the west. He contrasted his vision of a
forever open, clear and free Grant Park with Burnham's vision of
the Park which Ward saw as nothing more than a park in "which
city officials would crowd with buildings, transforming the
breathing spot for the poor into a showground of the educated rich.
I do not think it is right."164
The cost to Ward, however, was social disgrace and an
estimated $200,000 in today's dollars in legal fees.165 Ward
believed his efforts to preserve Grant Park would never be
appreciated.1 66 Today at 11th Street in Grant Park, on the east
side of the pedestrian bridge that crosses the Metra tracks to the
Museum Campus where the Field Museum was eventually built,
there is a small bust of Montgomery Ward with an inscription
the plat map inscriptions could not be condemned away).

But, Ward won

again. Id. at 915.
159. WILLE, supra note 134, at 78.
160. Id.
161. KAMIN, supra note 124, at 298.
162. At the last minute before the Field bequest was set to expire, the South
Park Commission and the Illinois Central Railroad reached agreement for the
museum to be built just outside the southern boundary of Grant Park on land
that was exempt from the prescriptive easement related to open space created
by the 1830s plat maps. WIELE, supra note 134, at 80.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165. Id. at 71.
166. In one of only a few of his public comments on the litigation, he was
reported to have said: "Perhaps I may yet see the public appreciate my efforts.
But I doubt it." Id. at 80.
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commemorating his battle to preserve Grant Park.
But Ward's battle to stop the Field Museum would not be the
last legal battle over Grant Park. The legal tangles over the
meaning of the inscriptions on the subdivision plats of the 1830s
have gone on to this day. The Art Institute had originally been
allowed to build in Grant Park because it had obtained the consent
of all adjacent property owners.16 7 The 1897 City of Chicago v.
Ward 6
decision recognized this method-in effect, a
reincarnation of the old frontage consent laws-as one of the legal
ways of voiding the open space restrictions on the old plat maps.
The third of the Ward cases, the 1909 Field Museum case held
that the plat map inscriptions prohibited "buildings" but not other
"structures . . . absolutely necessary for the comfort of the public
and the proper use of the park."169 The Illinois Supreme Court
mentions storm shelters, "band stands, lavatories, toilets, and the
like" as "absolutely necessary" structures in a public park and also
differentiated between construction above and below the surface of
the ground.170
In 1952, the Illinois Supreme Court again heard a case
involving Grant Park. The Chicago Park District proposed
constructing the Grant Park underground parking garage. A
Michigan Avenue building owner relying in part on the three
Montgomery Ward cases filed suit to stop the construction. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chi. Park

Dist.171 allowed the construction of the underground garage to
proceed. As support, it cited the distinctions between above ground
and underground construction and between buildings and
structures referenced in the Field Museum case.172 While it labeled
the underground garage itself as a "building," the vents and air
intakes that would be above ground were "structures" that would
be landscaped in such a way as not to block the views across Grant
Park.173 The garage and its above ground "structures" were
therefore allowed under the distinctions made in the previous
Ward decisions.1 74
167. Montgomery Ward later said he "regretted not fighting the Art Institute
construction." Id. at 75. Later the Art Institute successfully argued that its
expansions to the east into Grant Park were also covered by the original vote
since the additions were to the east and did not extend the 400 foot Michigan
Avenue frontage as originally approved. Id. at 75.
168. 48 N.E. 927 (Ill. 1897).
169. Field Museum, 89 N.E. at 736.
170. Id.
171. 106 N.E. 2d 359 (Ill. 1952).
172. Id. at 361.
173. Id. at 362.
174. Id. The Court would not go so far, however, as to rule that any type of
"structure" was automatically allowed in Grant Park: "it is drawing too fine a
line of distinction to say that the erection of structures generally would not be
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The plaintiffs in the Mich. Boulevard case also wanted the
Illinois Supreme Court to declare that the inscriptions on the
1830s maps restricted Grant Park to "park uses" only. The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected that argument. Nothing in the original
map inscriptions described the lands as restricted to "park" use"17 5
and this distinguished the Grant Park situation from the facts in a
number of other cases in which the Illinois courts had ruled that
dedications for park purposes imposed a more severe set of
restrictions on use. 176
Montgomery Ward would have been clearly upset by the
ruling in the Mich. Boulevard case that the dedication on the plat
maps did not restrict the land in front of Michigan Avenue to park
use. In his interview with the CHICAGO TRIBUNE in the wake of the
Field Museum case, he called the land east of Michigan Avenue
"park frontage on the lake."177 He would also have likely been
dismayed by the Mich. Boulevard case distinction between
"structures" (allowed subject to judicial review) and "buildings." In
another lawsuit, he had unsuccessfully attempted to enforce the
view restriction by enjoining the installation of overhead electric
trolley car lines on Michigan Avenue. 178
The Mich. Boulevard decision cleared the way for Grant Park
and Millennium Park as we know them today. Improvements are
carefully constructed to be structures (including music pavilions)
rather than buildings and much of the infrastructure is located
below ground.
Burnham continues to receive virtually all of the accolades for
the preservation of Chicago's lakefront. As Blair Kamin of the
CHICAGO TRIBUNE has put it, "[t]he lakefront and its parks
represent a legacy of incalculable value, a testament to visionaries
such as Daniel Burnham, who .

.

. recognized that public spaces

made better democracies, better citizens, and better lives."179 In
the case of Grant Park, at least, more acclaim should be given to
Montgomery Ward than to Daniel Burnham.

in violation of the spirit of the restrictions in the original dedications." Id. at
362.
175. Id. at 360.
176. See e.g., Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 71 N.E. 408 (Ill. 1904)
(enjoining property owners from constructing a road through a park that was
dedicated for public use); Village of Princeville v. Auten, 77 111. 325 (111. 1875)
(affirming the trial court's decision to prevent the village from building its
town hall on a space that had been dedicated as a "public square").
177. WILLE, supra note 134, at 80.
178. Chicago City Railway Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 76 Ill. App. 536
(1898).
179. KAMIN, supra note 124, at 298.
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POSTSCRIPT: REINVENTING THE BURNHAM VISION TODAY

And so, Grant Park today reflects a combination of two
visions, the Burnham vision of a cultural center and the Ward
vision of an open space preserved for the people of Chicago. It is
that perfect tension between the Hamiltonian democratic
(Republican) vision of Burnham as evidenced in the leadership of
the Chicago business and civic community in assuring the funding
for such cultural facilities as the Art Pritzker Pavilion and the
Ward vision of a democratic park for the every day working people
and families of his era in a crowded congested city.
The final Chapter of the Plan laid out very clearly the central
question that faced us as citizens and lawyers in 1909 and still
face us today when it comes to new plans for Chicago. "And what
hope is there that the people will desire to make Chicago an ideal
city?"180 An important part of the impetus for the 2010 celebration
of the centennial of the 1909 Plan of Chicago is to allow us to
pause and ask, "What will be our new vision for Chicago?"
Law students, lawyers and judges, like architects and
political and business leaders, during this celebration of the
Burnham/Bennett plan centennial need to find inspiration and a
renewed commitment to the spirit of the 1909 Plan of Chicago.
They need to understand and respect the importance of land use
law and development regulation to our quality of life. In a time of
budget constraints at every level of government, lawyers need to
continue to recognize that we must continue to commit our public
fiscal resources to accomplish great projects and to form public
private partnerships such as was done in the effort to create
Millennium Park and the attempt to bring the Olympics to
Chicago.
And so over the past year, the City of Chicago has been
celebrating the centennial of Daniel Burnham's visionary plan for
Chicago. The centennial celebration did not involve major new
public works projects to, for example, complete the lagoon and
island system envisioned along Chicago's lakefront. Nor did it
involve the construction of any major monuments to Burnhamalthough one is proposed for the front lawn of the Field Museum.
Instead, it has been about finding new inspiration for planning
Chicago.

180. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 119.
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The inspiration for law students and young lawyers in
particular can be found in the following words from the legal
appendix to the 1909 Plan:
The purpose of an inquiry into the legal aspects of the Plan of
Chicago is to ascertain to what extent and in what manner the Plan
can be carried out under the existing laws, to suggest such
additional legislation as may be necessary or desirable, and to
consider how far such legislation is controlled or prevented by
existing constitutional provisions.1 81
As Daniel Burnham also put it so well, "Let your watchword
be order, and your beacon beauty." 182

181. Id. at 127.
182. Attributed to Daniel Burnham.

